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Montaigne beyond the Rhine: 
The Essais in the Work of Christoph Besold 
 
John O’Brien 
 
Seven times rector of the University of Tübingen, the city in which he was born, Christoph 
Besold (1577-1638)1 belongs to an important sub-set of readers of the Essais in early modern 
Europe: the legal profession.  In his large number of works of juridical, political and 
theological learning, he quotes from or refers to the essayist over one hundred times, always 
in French even though his own writings are in Latin. From the page numbers which he 
scrupulously includes on most occasions in his quotations and references, it is clear that he 
owned one of the early seventeenth-century editions of the Essais.  The pattern of his 
publications suggest that the likeliest is either the 1608 or the 1611 French edition of the 
Essais.2 
 
The purpose of this chapter will be to discuss the distinctive contribution Montaigne 
makes to Besold’s work by examining key instances of his occurrence.  As we shall see, such 
occurrences not only provide an insight into a crucial moment in the history of reading, but 
also have a larger philosophical rationale.  In the process, the transit of the Essais will emerge 
not just as a passing through, nor even a transmission of intellectual positions or materials for 
study and writing, important though these are, but as a momentum which involves their re-
framing. Besold offers a particularly significant example of this notion of transit, precisely 
because he has a strong sense of belonging to an intellectual tradition reaching back to 
Montaigne, while nonetheless re-modelling his author for his own specific context and needs.  
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His attempt to combine these two aspects results in tensions that are indicative of historical 
and intellectual change. 
  
 Besold’s high regard for the French writer comes through constantly in his writings.  
The essayist is ‘magnus Montanus’ (the great Montaigne) or ‘Magnus Michaël Montanus’ 
(the great Michel de Montaigne),3 ‘Gallorum Socrates’ (the French Socrates),4 ‘seculi nostri 
inter Philosophos Phœnix’ (the philosophical phoenix of our age).5 There is more than 
personal admiration at stake here. Two of the descriptors also adumbrate a view of him as a 
philosopher of a particular kind.  Montaigne as a French Socrates is a special variant on 
Montaigne as Thales, Lipsius’s sobriquet which a number of early modern writers quote.6   
Some understanding of what this idea means to Besold is provided by his comment in the 
Specimen locorum communium philosophiæ of 1626, where an entry entitled ‘Philosophia. 
Eruditio’ (Philosophy. Learning) runs as follows: 
 
Cùm philosophia studium sapientiæ sit; necesse est, ut continuus labor existat: Et nec 
eam Socrates habebat pro arte, sed tantùm pro exercitio quodam; omnia refutans, nihil 
probans. Aliud est studium Theologiæ, quod Socrates certum statuebat; & de eo, à 
communi antiquâ persuasione, ratiocinabatur. vide omninò Lactantium, lib.3.cap.2. 
quod & ubivis intendere videtur Michaël Montanus: in Gallicis exercitationib. suis.7 
 
(Since philosophy is the love of wisdom, it necessarily involves a continuous activity. 
And nor did Socrates hold it to be an art, but only a sort of exercise; refuting 
everything, proving nothing. Quite different is the study of Theology, which Socrates 
considered certain; and he used to argue about it from long-established common 
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opinion.  See in general Lactantius book 3, chapter 2.  Michel de Montaigne also 
seems to aim for this everywhere in his Essais.) 
 
Recalling Cicero’s definition of philosophy as the love of wisdom, but departing from him by 
disassociating human things from divine things,8 Besold no less rejects Lactantius’s 
condemnation of philosophy as idle conjecture by turning philosophy into a Socratic enquiry 
which is an exercise or an activity, not an art or a craft.  Montaigne would agree. In what 
seems a precursor of Besold’s ‘omnia refutans, nihil probans’, chapter 2.12 of the Essais 
similarly pictures Socrates as ‘tousjours demandant et esmouvant la dispute, jamais 
l’arrestant, jamais satisfaisant’ (V 509) (always asking questions and stirring up discussion, 
never concluding, never satisfying, F 377), while in ‘De la moderation’, Montaigne remarks 
that in respect of human behaviour, philosophy and theology ‘se meslent de tout’ (V 198) 
(enter in everywhere, F 147), in the same way that Besold juxtaposes in this passage a 
theologian and a philosopher. A twofold picture thus emerges of Montaigne’s project in 
Besold’s thinking. It is conceived of as a Socratic practice of flexible scope, an ‘exercitium’ 
or ‘exercitatio’ echoed in the very Latin title he gives the Essais: exercitationes. Yet, 
secondly, Montaigne’s discussion of theological topics is no less Socratic, in that it respects 
theology as certain and deploys ‘communis antiqua persuasio’; his well-known theological 
conservatism now becomes an intelligible feature of his overall Socratic outlook.  At the 
same time, however, Besold’s use of the modal ‘videtur’ (seems) – ‘intendere videtur’ (seems 
to aim at this) – introduces a note of grammatical caution into the description; putting into 
practice the earlier ‘nihil probans’ (proving nothing), it refuses to resolve, preferring 
refutation to assertion as part of the exercise, exercitium, of which it is itself a linguistic 
illustration.  
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As a counterpart to this extract, the preface to Principium et finis politicæ doctrinæ, 
published in 1625, a year before the Specimen, is less reserved in its approach. Here Besold 
speaks in his own name and of his own task: 
 
Adhuc dum versor in novorum Academicorum Schola:  Quæro omnia, dubitans 
plerunque & mihi diffidens. Sæpè non tàm id sensi, quod dictum à me est: quàm 
exercere ingenium volui, materiæ difficultate. vide 
Montaig.lib.2.cap.12.fol.m.467.&c.&.fol.480. Pherecides morti appropinquans, 
Thaleti sua scripta commendavit: de iis ita sensit, nullam ea certitudinem continere, 
quâ sibimetipsi satisfacere possint. Idem ego censeo de meis. Acquiesco solùm in 
perpetuo Ecclesiæ vetustioris consensu: sed eum adhuc indago.9 
 
(While I am still at the school of the New Academics: I search into everything, 
doubting most things and mistrusting myself.  Often, it is not so much that I have 
believed what I have said as that I wanted to exercise my wits on the difficulty of the 
material. See Montaigne book 2, chapter 12, page 467 in my copy etc and page 480. 
Pherecides drawing close to death entrusted his writings to Thales: his opinion of 
them was they contained no certainty with which he might be satisfied.  I think the 
same about my writings. I assent only to the unbroken agreement of the older Church: 
but I still inquire into it.) 
 
With its dense textual echoes and patterning, this passage is altogether a much more complex 
exercise than its neighbour, not least because it also constitutes one of the rare episodes in 
self-reflection in Besold’s entire corpus.  The references to Montaigne provide a way into his 
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thinking. Both are to the ‘Apologie de Raymond Sebond’, but Besold reverses the order in 
which they appear in chapter 2.12, opening his statement with the later passage: 
 
Cicero mesme, qui deuoit au sçavoir tout son vaillant, Valerius dit que sur sa 
vieillesse il commença à desestimer les lettres. Et pendant qu’il les traictoit, c’estoit 
sans obligation d’aucun party: suiuant ce qui luy sembloit probable, tantost en l’vne 
secte, tantost en l’autre: se tenant tousiours sous la dubitation de l’Academie.  
Dicendum est, sed ita vt nihil affirmem: quaeram omnia, dubitans plerumque & mihi 
diffidens. (1608/1611, 468; V, 501) 
 
(As for Cicero himself, who owed all his worth to learning, Valerius says that in his 
old age he began to lose his esteem for letters. And while he practised them, it was 
without obligation to any party, following what seemed probable to him now in one 
sect, now in another, keeping himself always in Academic doubt. I must speak, but in 
such a way as to affirm nothing; I shall search into all things, doubting most things 
and mistrusting myself. F, 370-71) 
 
The Latin quotation is from Cicero’s De divinatione II.8, where Cicero is replying to his 
brother Quintus, but Besold detaches it from its original context, which is suppressed or at 
best summarily represented by the phrase ‘Adhuc dum versor in novorum Academicorum 
Schola’ (while I am still at the School of the New Academics). He then re-attaches it to a 
quite different quotation from a different author embedded in another, later part of the 
‘Apologie’, where Montaigne complains that with philosophical sects such as the ‘nouuelle 
Academique’, ‘n’ayans rien trouué de si caché dequoy ils n’ayent voulu parler, il leur est 
souuent force de forger des conjectures foibles & folles, non qu’ils les prinssent eux mesmes 
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pour fondement, ne pour establir quelque verité, mais pour l’exercice de leur estude: Non tam 
id sensisse, quod dicerent, quàm exercere ingenia materiæ difficultate videntur 
voluisse’ (1608/1611, 480; V 512) (having found nothing so occult that they did not want to 
talk about it, they often had to forge weak and foolish conjectures; not that they took 
themselves for a foundation, or to establish any truth, but for the exercise of their study. They 
seemed not so much to believe what they said as to want to exercise their wits on the difficulty 
of the matter, F 380). Quintilian II.17.4 is the source of the Latin quotation here. 
 
The next phase of the Besold extract, involving an anecdote about Pherecydes, 
paraphrases a slightly longer passage in Montaigne, as follows: 
 
Pherecydes, l’vn des sept sages, escrivant à Thales, comme il expiroit, I’ay, dit il,  
ordonné aux miens, apres qu’ils m’auront enterré de t’apporter mes escrits. S’ils 
contentent & toy & les autres Sages, publie les: sinon, supprime les. Ils ne contiennent 
nulle certitude qui me satisface à moy-mesme. Aussi ne fay-ie pas profession de 
sçauoir la verité, ny d’y atteindre (1608/1611, 467-68; V, 501).   
  
(Pherecydes, one of the Seven Sages, writing to Thales as he was dying, said: ‘I have 
ordered my friends, after they have buried me, to bring you my writings. If they 
satisfy you and the other sages, publish them; if not, suppress them they contain no 
certainty that satisfies myself. Nor do I profess to know the truth and to attain it’. F, 
370) 
 
When this passage re-appears in Besold, the German jurist adds a closing comment about 
inquiring into the unbroken consensus of the Church. This takes Montaigne’s text in an 
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unforeseen direction; but it will herald a specific re-contextualisation of the essayist – in the 
theological sphere – whose importance will be considered later. 
 
This whole passage in the Principium et finis is of typical Besoldian complexity and 
displays a set of clearly defined technical features.  In the first place, it composes a mosaic or 
marquetry which brings together passages not previously immediately connected in 
Montaigne in such a way as to forge them into a new coherent whole with a revised purpose.  
This technique was common to legal writing in the early seventeenth century and in respect 
of Montaigne, the dominant model was Charron.  When, for example, the Toulouse 
parlementaire La Roche Flavin composed his own marquetry of Montaigne passages in his 
Treze Livres des Parlemens de France of 1617, a number had already appeared in Charron 
and he is not infrequently quotes Charron rather than directly citing Montaigne.10 In 
following that model, Besold implicitly thinks of his purpose as that of the philosopher-jurist, 
according to a tradition of which Montaigne was considered to be a significant modern 
predecessor.  Secondly, starting with the initial ‘versor’, the first-person pronoun now 
coordinates all the diverse quotations, whose syntax is re-worked as necessary to foreground 
the singular voice of the lawyer-philosopher. It is no longer Cicero or Quintilian or 
Montaigne who predominates, even though they are plainly visible, but Besold, and the 
composite passages of which this extract is composed are marshalled into activity by the 
constantly repeated ‘ego’ of the writer (‘versor’, ‘quæro’, ‘sensi’, ‘censeo’, ‘acquiesco’, 
‘indago’). Thirdly, the highly allusive quality of this extract develops the same technique that 
Montaigne himself employs. While Besold sends his readers back to the original contexts by 
specifying pages in a particular edition, his intricate surface manipulations of these 
underlying texts clearly rely on the reader’s intimate knowledge and understanding of the 
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Essais. In a sense, Besold seeks to out-Montaigne Montaigne; but he is not the only one of 
the essayist’s readers to do so. 
 
 The technical versatility of this passage points, in turn, to its intellectual purpose. It 
represents a conceptualisation of Besold’s role as a writer and thinker, but also equips him for 
his task as a particular type of investigator.  Of prime importance here is the role played by 
the New Academy. In declaring himself a student at their School, Besold seems to make no 
clear distinction between Academic and Pyrrhonian scepticism; but, as Schmitt has shown, 
this was by no means uncommon in early modern writing.11 The pairing of Cicero and 
Pherecydes, under the umbrella of New Academy, may seem equally disconcerting, as only 
Cicero could be considered, strictly speaking, the classical representative of this sect.12 
However, the inclusion of Pherecydes widens its ambit to embrace one of the Seven Sages 
who regards his own writings as not attaining certainty and truth. The context of the quotation 
from De Divinatione also shows Cicero himself practising Academic doubt by switching to 
and fro between tenets held by different philosophical schools.  The passage from Besold’s 
Specimen, quoted at the beginning of this chapter, can also be brought in at this point.  
Socrates, pictured there as proving nothing and refuting everything, was reclaimed by 
Arcesilaus, the founder of the New Academy, as a Sceptic with the mission to refute: ‘the 
outcome of philosophical enquiry is the elimination of poorly founded beliefs. This is 
accomplished by arguing against anything anyone is willing to defend’.13  Cicero likewise 
traces that New Academy practice of refutation back to Socrates and has Varro say of him in 
the Academica, ‘ita disputat ut nihil affirmet ipse refellat alios’ (Acad. I.16) (‘he argues in 
such a way that he himself affirms nothing but refutes others’).14  Echoing that description 
from the Academica, a work familiar to his readers, Besold attaches himself to that same 
tradition, in which, for him, Montaigne is the key figure adumbrating in his work a history of 
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Sceptical philosophy, a method of inquiry and a manner of writing: all three are compacted 
together in these two passages. In Besold’s reworking of the classical philosophical 
traditions, it is Montaigne who, as the French Socrates, is the modern embodiment of all these 
characteristics. 
 
 Nothing like a full philosophical programme is set out in Besold; these quoted 
passages are the closest to a broader conceptualisation of his outlook that he provides. Like 
other lawyers who read the French essayist, such as Bernard Automne and Claude Expilly in 
France,15 he prefers to engage pragmatically with his author, using him as a source of 
quotations and allusions in order to substantiate or refute particular points of view.  
Nonetheless, in the light of the two passages we have studied already, a number of other 
statements in Besold’s œuvre now become intelligible. In the Politica of 1620, for example, 
he sketches a one-sentence alignment of classical philosophers in whom he clearly discerns 
an affinity:  ‘Undè Socrates nihil se scire professus est, Phyrro [sic] de omnibus dubitavit: 
Democritus in puteo veritatem submersam esse dixit’ (Whence Socrates declared that he 
knew nothing and Pyrrho doubted about all matters; and Democritus said that truth was at the 
bottom of a well).16 What connects these thinkers is the rather loose association of ignorance, 
doubt and a truth that is out of reach, in the same way that the earlier anecdote about 
Pherecydes highlights the question of uncertainty.  Montaigne is credited with that same 
Socratic ignorance in De Verae Philosophiae fundamento of 1630. In that work, Besold 
complains about those who deny knowledge either as necessary or even possible and who 
impose limits on knowing. ‘Exemplum si petis,’ he continues, ‘profero Magni Michaëlis 
Montani: qui ipse fatetur, in omnibus se versatum, in nullo aliquid scire. Sed malim viri tanti 
inscitiâ fruisci, quàm imaginariam eruditionem sciolorum possidere [...]’ (If you want an 
example, I mention the great Michel de Montaigne, who himself admits that he was schooled 
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in every discipline, but knows nothing about any. But I would prefer to enjoy the ignorance 
of such a great man than to possess the imaginary learning of those with only a smattering of 
knowledge).17  A printed note in the margin of De Verae Philosophiae fundamento at that 
point refers the reader to ‘De l’institution des enfans’, at the beginning of which Montaigne 
does indeed admit that the cursory knowledge he gained as a child left him with ‘un peu de 
chaque chose et rien du tout’ (V 145) (a little of everything and nothing thoroughly, F 107).  
Yet notice how the passage displays a shift in Besold’s attitude.  At the outset, Montaigne is 
cited as an instance of the trend of which Besold disapproves, with a specific allusion to the 
Essais to support his claim; but then, as the tell-tale epithet ‘magni’ (great) hints, the 
perspective switches and the extract ends with praise of Montaigne’s ignorance.  A few pages 
earlier in the same work comes a quotation from ‘De l’experience’, with the comment: ‘De 
l’experience que j’ay de moy, je trouve assez, dequoy me faire sage, si j’estois bon escholier, 
inquit Gallorum Socrates, Michaël Montanus’ (‘Of the experience I have of myself, I find 
enough with which to make myself wise, if I were a good student,’ says the French Socrates, 
Michel de Montaigne).18 ‘Sagesse’, ‘sapientia’, ‘wisdom’ is the philosopher’s traditional goal 
and by joining together Socrates and Montaigne with education and experience, Besold’s 
praise of ignorance which follows is drawn into the same ambit, transforming Montaigne’s 
personal admission into a philosophical avowal. 
 
 How does this philosophical sense of Montaigne as a Socratic enquirer affect Besold’s 
use of him in the course of his writings as a whole?  Two principal areas will be examined: 
theology and politics.19  In the case of the first of these, the need to reconcile a philosophical 
mission with a confessional identity was paramount. In the passage from Principium et finis 
quoted earlier, we saw that Besold closes with the statement that he assents to the unbroken 
consensus of the older Church, but nonetheless inquires into it: that closing rider gains in 
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significance in the light of Besold’s understanding of Montaigne’s philosophical project, for 
the theological implications, or the potential theological implications, of the Essais are 
sometimes uppermost in Besold’s mind. The Specimen, for example, is remarkable for 
including two of Montaigne’s most famous pronouncements: ‘Certes, c’est un subject 
merveilleusement vain, divers, et ondoyant, que l’homme. Il est malaisé d’y fonder jugement 
constant et uniforme’ (V 9) (Truly man is a marvellously vain, diverse and undulating 
subject. It is hard to found any constant and uniform judgement on him, F 5) and ‘Chacun 
regarde devant soy; moy je regarde dedans moy’ (V 657) (Everyone looks in front of him; as 
for me, I look inside of me, F 499). Neither has theological implications in its original 
context, but Besold re-positions them within a framework of imitatio Christi combined with 
the Lutheran principle of justification, classifing the first under the heading ‘Judicare 
proximum, et cuncta, ut debemus’ (To judge our neighbour and all things as we should) and 
the second under ‘Interna conversatio’ (Inward conversation).20 In De Consilio politico, he 
uses the French writer as a weapon against the dangers of atheism, adducing him on two 
occasions in a short sequence of axioms on this topic.  Guicciardini is the target in one: 
‘Species Atheismi est, omnia facta, omnesque eventus, rationi alicui politicæ assignare: 
eoque nomine peccare Guicciardinum, prudentissimum aliàs, civilisque disciplinæ 
callentissimum scriptorem; notat Montanus. lib.2.des essais.cap.10.’21 (It is a kind of atheism 
to attribute all deeds and all events to some political reason; and on that account Montaigne 
notes in book 2 of the Essais, chapter 10, that Guicciardini goes astray, although in other 
respects a very learned writer and a great expert in political thought).  Montaigne’s criticism 
of Guicciardini comes after he has recognized that the Italian conceals nothing out of hatred, 
favour or vanity. He then expresses reservations: ‘J’ay aussi remerqué cecy, que de tant 
d’ames et effects qu’il juge, de tant de mouvemens et conseils, il n’en rapporte jamais un seul 
à la vertu, religion et conscience, comme si ces parties là estoyent du tout esteintes au monde’ 
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(1608/11, 386; V 419) (I have also noted this, that of so many souls and actions that he 
judges, so many motives and plans, he never refers a single one to virtue, religion, and 
conscience, as if these qualities were wholly extinct in the world, F 305). Montaigne does not 
specifically ascribe Guicciardini’s characteristics to atheism and the trio he lists includes 
virtue and conscience along with religion; he also adds – which Besold omits – that 
Guicciardini’s penchant in this regard may indicate that he judged everyone according to his 
own tastes and preferences.  Elsewhere, Besold draws on ‘C’est folie de rapporter le vray et 
le faux à nostre suffisance’ for evidence that to believe in nothing other than what conforms 
to reason is the way closest to atheism (proxima est ad Atheismum via).22  On this occasion, 
Besold does not specify a page number, but he may have in mind Montaigne’s attack on 
those who disbelieve miracles in comments such as the following: ‘C’est une hardiesse 
dangereuse et de consequence, outre l’absurde temerité qu’elle traine quant et soy, de 
mespriser ce que nous ne concevons pas’ (V 181) (It is a dangerous and fateful presumption, 
besides the absurd temerity that it implies, to disdain what we do not comprehend, F 134). 
There is no mention of atheism in this Montaignian context, except perhaps by implication; 
the point is the obedience we owe the laws of ecclesiastical polity.  In both instances, Besold 
reads the essayist according to concerns about ecclesiastical orthodoxy and confessional 
identity. 
 
Such theological concerns could affect Besold’s view of Montaigne himself. In the 
theological perspective, he reflects in a different way on the French writer’s Sceptical 
outlook: 
 
Atheorum etiam proprium est, statuere omnia esse incerta: ut Pyrrhonici faciunt; 
cuncta defendere, omnia evertere [...]. Tales etiam sunt auctores, qui quæque 
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certissima convellere, & in dubium vocare nituntur, quemadmodum Sanchez. in tr. 
Quod nil scitur. Certè quod invitus dico, multa habet ad Atheismum declinantia 
Michael Montanus, in libro des essais. Gallorum Socrates, & quem summis laudibus 
evehit Lipsius, in Epistol. ad eum scriptis. Hic certè perpetuò dubitat, jus naturæ 
rationale negat, gentes solo naturæ ductu viventes, quales fuêre olim Amiricani [sic], 
aliis præfert: sensibus certitudinem adimit, brutis rationem adscribit; sed tandem 
tentatio Atheismi est felicitas impiorum, Psalm.73.vers.10.&c. [...].23 
 
(It is also the characteristic of atheists to decree that all things are uncertain, as the 
Pyrrhonians do; to defend everything and to overturn all things. [...] Such are the 
writers who strive to tear up certainty and call it into doubt, like Sanchez in the 
treatise That Nothing is Known. Certainly, though I say so unwillingly, Michel de 
Montaigne, the French Socrates, so very highly extolled by Lipsius in his letters to 
him, has much in his Essais that tends towards atheism.  He certainly constantly 
doubts, he denies the rational law of nature and prefers peoples living under the 
guidance of nature, such as the Americans once did, to others; he deprives the senses 
of certainty and attributes reason to animals; but in the end the temptation of atheism 
is the happiness of the impious, Psalm 73 v. 10 etc.) 
 
The key term here is doubt. Aporetike is one of the terms, along with skeptike and ephektike, 
that is used in Sextus Empiricus to describe the philosophical activity of Ancient Sceptics. In 
Henri Estienne’s Latin 1562 translation of Sextus (which is in fact a reprint of Traversari’s of 
1433), this term and its associated verb, aporein, are translated as ‘dubitatoria’ (doubtful) and 
‘dubitare’ (to doubt): Scepticism is ‘doubtful’ in the sense that it enquires into everything 
without final resolution.24 Yet the origin of this Latin translation stretches further back.  It is 
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Cicero who, in the Academica, introduces the term ‘dubitatio’ (doubt) (e.g. Acad. I.17, 
‘Socraticam dubitationem’ [Socratic doubt]) and the verb ‘dubito’ (to doubt) (e.g. Acad. II. 8, 
106 and II.11) into his discussion of Scepticism.  Perhaps under his influence, the idea caught 
on and doubt is certainly the hallmark of Pyrrhonian Scepticism for Montaigne. One of the 
most famous passages in the ‘Apologie’ characterizes Pyrrhonism in just that way (V 503), 
but Montaigne makes it clear in context that doubt is related to Sceptical contradiction-as-
refutation and to the preference for non-assertion.  Modern critics such as Tournon have also 
emphasized that doubt for Montaigne has to be understood strictly in the context of 
Pyrrhonian zetesis and not outside of that framework.25  In historical terms, however, even 
before the time Besold comes to publish in the early seventeenth century, Academic and 
Pyrrhonian doubt has become associated with an active destruction of certainty in the 
religious sense and writers such as Sanchez and, earlier, Castellio are taken as evidence of 
that tendency.26  Indeed, in writing elsewhere about education and literature, Besold also 
connects Sanchez’s name with atheism, insofar as, Besold argues, he seeks to destroy 
knowledge and to claim that nothing can be known, although he also notes that Montaigne 
defends Pyrrhonism.27 In the present context, Montaigne’s name is added to that of Sanchez 
regretfully, almost as an after-thought, and Besold rounds off his reflections with a closing 
gloss from Scripture.  
 
The list of dubious opinions Besold discerned here in the essayist was nonetheless to 
be broadly echoed in some other writers of any religious persuasion, in the context of the 
essayist’s alleged libertinism.28 By way of comparison with Besold, it is worth instancing 
occasions when the ‘Apologie’ features in that respect. For example, in 1651, the Lutheran 
legal scholar, Kaspar Klock (1583-1655), could be found maintaining as follows:  
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Providentiam Divinam si quis removeat, & Naturæ omnia tribuere velit, istum 
Atheum esse omninò; quo & illa Lucretii intendunt: 
– Corpoream naturam animi esse necesse est, 
Corpor[e]is quoniam telis, ictúque laborat.   
Idemque suggerit Iul. Cæsar Vanninus [...] ut & Michael Montanus libr. 2. des Essais. 
cap. 12. fol. 519. quorum hic atheismi subtilioris suspectus [...]’ 
 
(If anyone removes divine providence and wishes to attribute everything to Nature, he 
is an utter atheist. These lines of Lucretius move in that direction: ‘The nature of the 
mind is necessarily corporeal, since it labours under physical cuts and blows’. Giulio 
Cesare Vanini suggests the same [...], as does also Michel de Montaigne in book 2 of 
the Essais, chapter 12, p. 519.  The second of these is suspected of a subtler atheism 
[...]).29 
 
These lines of Lucretius are quoted in the ‘Apologie’ by Montaigne (V 550) as a way of 
highlighting the troubled, uncertain nature of the human mind (‘animus’), but the page 
reference given by Klock – to an edition identical to or with the same pagination as 1608 – 
carries a printed marginal summary which refers not to the mind, but to the soul (‘âme’, 
‘anima’ in Latin rather than ‘animus’). Klock may thus have thought that Montaigne was 
citing Lucretius in support of a material view of the soul, a clearly heterodox opinion.  
Interestingly, he also claims shortly before this passage that he is merely quoting Besold’s De 
majestate, but in fact in that work Besold attributes to Vanini the heterodox views 
summarised by Klock without once mentioning Montaigne.30 Klock thus provides a 
composite account, partly drawn from Besold and partly from his own reading.  Evoking 
Vanini alongside Montaigne steers the essayist into dangerous waters, but it is not without 
16 
 
precedent at that point in the seventeenth century: in a letter of 1647, Balzac makes the same 
connection, more expressly than Garasse, for example, who had associated Vanini with 
Charron, but not Montaigne.31 On the Catholic side of the confessional divide, the Franciscan 
Jean Boucher (?-1631) was no less forthright. In Les Triomphes de la religion chrestienne of 
1628, he referred to one of the same pages of the ‘Apologie’ as Besold in Principium et finis 
and in the same or a similar edition, but with the opposite opinion. Objecting to Montaigne’s 
description of God as ‘recevant et prenant en bonne part l’honneur et la reverence que les 
humains luy rendoient soubs quelque visage, sous quelque nom et en quelque maniere que ce 
fut’ (1608/1611 480; V 513) (accepting and taking in good part the honour and reverence that 
human beings rendered him, under whatever aspect, under whatever name, in whatever 
manner, F 380), he counters that this statement encourages heretics, schismatics and pagans 
to persist in the error of their ways.32  He then attempts to turn Montaigne’s reasoning against 
him when he quotes the later argument from the ‘Apologie’ that it is a strange fancy to pay 
for divine goodness with our afflictions (1608/1611 489; V 522; F 388).33  Contextually, it is 
clear that these are two quite separate points, but for Boucher they are proof of the way in 
which Montaigne ‘a mal mené la Religion’ (has mistreated religion).34 Klock and Boucher 
were not the only early modern readers who found the ‘Apologie’ of theological interest,35 
but by comparison Besold’s criticisms, while clearly reflecting his disquiet, seem mild and 
are restricted to one part of one work. 
 
If theology holds an important place in Besold’s dealings with Montaigne, a much 
larger group of quotations from and references to the Essais relates to the political sphere. 
While the overarching context in Besold is that of the debate between absolutism and 
constitutionalism, politics also covers a broad spectrum whose sub-areas include military 
science and civic life as well as statecraft.36  It may well be that Besold, without expressly 
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stating it, saw a parallel between Montaigne’s experience of the Wars of Religion and his 
own during the Thirty Years War and certainly many of his references to Montaigne here 
occur in the framework of war and warfare. For example, he derives from the Essais a sharp 
sense of the fickleness of Fortune. At one level, fortified by his reading of ‘La Fortune se 
rencontre souvent au train de la raison’, he resists submission to Fortune as incompatible with 
the Christian’s obedience to God.37 His more general view, however, acknowledges the 
ubiquity of the very force he opposes. Thus in the Dissertatio de arte iureque belli of 1624, 
two quotations from ‘Des destries’, both along the same lines, emphasise the uncertainty of 
technology. The pistol, for instance: ‘Il est bien plus apparent de s’asseurer d’une espée que 
nous tenons au poing, que du boulet qui eschappe de nostre pistole, en laquelle il y a 
plusieurs pieces, [la poudre, la pierre, le rouet,] desquelles la moindre qui viendra à faillir, 
vous fera faillir vostre fortune’ (V 290) (It is much more sensible to rely on a sword that we 
hold in our hand than on the bullet that escapes out of our pistol, in which there are many 
parts [– the powder, the flint, the lock –] the least of which, by failing, will make your fortune 
fail, F 211).38 Even the horse can seem a unnecessary complication: ‘vous engagez [quoy que 
die Chrysantez en Xenophon] vostre valeur et vostre fortune à celle de vostre cheval: ses 
playes & sa mort, tirent la vostre en consequence; son effroy ou sa fougue vous rendent ou 
temeraire ou làche’ (V 289) ([No matter what Chrysantes says in Xenophon] you stake your 
valor and your fortune on that of your horse; his wounds and his death bring on yours as a 
consequence; his fright or his impetuosity makes you either rash or cowardly).39 And from 
this ‘elegant formulation’, Besold draws his conclusion: ‘Ac certa & secura multò magis est 
stataria peditum pugna’ (Fighting on foot is much more certain and secure).40 ‘More certain 
and secure’ might seem just a sensible reaction, but Besold’s point here is also Montaigne’s: 
the horse, like the pistol, is to be seen as the embodiment of fortune, not a taken-for-granted 
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necessity of modern warfare. It is that basic uncertainty and fickleness which colours the 
German writer’s approach, as it does his French source. 
 
Unsurprisingly in this context, chapter 1.47, ‘De l’incertitude de nostre jugement’, 
attracts Besold’s attention and it informs his attitude towards a specific question of military 
tactics: 
 
Sed pro eo an hostis sit domi expectandus, Rationes sunt ex utraque parte, quas 
adducit Michaël Montanus, lib. 1. des essais, cap. 47.fol.m.261.&c. qui tandem 
concludit: nil hîc certi statui posse, cùm in bello præsertim, etiam optimè deliberata, 
sortiantur tristem eventum. Nous avons bien accoustume [sic] de dire, avec raison, 
que les evenemens & yssues dependent notamment en la guerre pour la plus part de 
la fortune: la quelle ne se veut pas renger & assujettir à nostre discours & prudence. 
[= V 286] 
 
 (But on the issue of whether the enemy is to be awaited on home ground, there are 
arguments on both sides, as set out by Michel de Montaigne in book 1 of the Essais, 
chapter 47, p. 261 etc in my copy, and his eventual conclusion is that there is no 
possible certain resolution on this question since, in war especially, even the most 
carefully laid plans may turn out badly. ‘Thus we are quite wont to say, with reason, 
that events and outcomes depend for the most part, especially in war, on Fortune, who 
will not fall into line and subject herself to our reason and foresight’, F 209). 
 
The crucial features that Besold identifies in his reading of ‘De l’incertitude...’ are its 
deployment of arguments in utramque partem (on both sides of the question: ‘ex utraque 
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parte’ is Besold’s expression) and the ultimate impossibility of any secure solution to the 
problems the chapter raises.  Both features tally not only with the concept of fortune, but with 
those of equipollence and uncertainty that characterize Montaigne’s thinking in Sceptical 
mode as well as Besold’s.  The terminology the German jurist uses in this passage does not 
need to be specified as Sceptical, for its very choice combined with the presence of 
Montaigne disposes his reader in that direction. In other places, Besold can make greater 
assumptions still. When discussing how to deal with particularly baffling situations, he 
simply advises: ‘Attamen in rebus planè dubiis, licet ἐπεχεῖν’ (Nevertheless, in matters that 
are completely doubtful, one may suspend one’s judgement).41  The Sceptical lexicon of this 
whole sentence and the choice of ἐπεχεῖν (to suspend one’s judgement), one of the key 
Pyrrhonist notions, confirm the intertextual reminiscence. Nothing in the original context 
prepares for the sudden introduction of such terminology, which is assumed to be part of the 
intellectual koine of the educated reader. At the level of conceptual approach as well as 
compositional technique, the influence of the Essais can be felt, even when, as in the last 
example, there is no express reference to Montaigne’s work. 
 
With its Montaignian colouring, Besold’s thinking about uncertainty likewise affects 
his view of statecraft, especially the issues of counsel, forethought and planning ahead.  
These too are thought to be susceptible to Fortune. In De Consilio politico, this point is 
phrased as a general one, through a series of aphorisms spread over successive pages: it is 
impossible to set down a rule to which Fortune does not present an exception; human 
forethought is futile, as Fortune maintains her grip over events; anyone wishing to make 
provision for his plans must allow room for Fortune.  In each case, the aphorism is 
accompanied by precise quotations from Montaigne illustrating the same principles.42  It is 
against this background that we should situate Besold’s preference for continuity over change 
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in matters of government.  One of many statements of his views on this matter is likewise to 
be found in De Consilio politico, quoting from ‘De la praesumption’: ‘Et magis conservando, 
quàm immutando statui studere debemus. [...] Et pourtant, selon mon humeur, és affaires 
publiques, il n’est aucun si mauvais train, pourveu, qu’il aye de l’aage, & de la constance, 
qui ne vaille mieux, que le changement, & le remuement, &c. Quæ est sententia magni 
Montani.2.des essais.c.17.f.m.629.’ (And we must strive more to preserve than to change the 
state. [...] ‘And, therefore, to my mind, in public affairs there is no course so bad, provided 
that it is old and stable, that is not better than change and commotion’ etc (F 497). Which is 
the opinion of the great Montaigne, book 2 of the Essais, chapter 17, p. 629 in my copy [= V 
655]).43 In general political terms, Besold advocates a mixed sovereignty, especially in his De 
Statu reipublicae mixto of 1614 and 1625,44 yet he acknowledges, for example, that to live 
under a monarchy is considered the highest form of freedom in France (‘in Galliis, summam 
esse Libertatem, vivere sub Rege, Michel de Montaigne, lib.1.des Essais, 
cap.42.f.mihi.244’).45  The specific page reference he makes here, to the chapter ‘De 
l’inequalité qui est entre nous’, misreads Montaigne’s point, however. The essayist is arguing 
that the French gentleman living far from court, in Brittany for instance, can live in freedom 
because he hears of the king hardly twice in his life; if he leads a retired existence of this 
kind, ‘il est aussi libre que le Duc de Venise’ (V 266) ([he] is a free as the Doge of Venice, F 
195). What is a qualified statement in Montaigne becomes an absolute statement in Besold. 
This is not the only such occasion. In the same work, De Reipublicæ...comparatione, Besold 
recognizes that Montaigne prefers Epaminondas to other princes and leaders and then 
exclaims: ‘Quot quæso, viros virtute præstantes, similes alios, laudare possunt Democratiæ?’ 
(How many men preeminent in virtue and others similar can democracies praise, prithee?).46  
Democracy for Besold is an unmixed, absolute constitution, little more than the rule of the 
mob, devoid of virtue, and he now recruits Montaigne to the cause of a specific political idea, 
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turning the essayist’s own political conservatism into a deeper hostility to particular forms of 
government.  By extension, some of Besold’s models for civic life and princely government 
are to be found overseas. He uses Montaigne’s Brazilians to exemplify how some think the 
rule of the many is preferable to the rule of one, even though the latter is, in his opinion, 
clearly the better option,47 how the Golden Age was to be found among the ‘Americani’ 
before the coming of the Spanish and exists among the ‘Meridionales’ even today48 and how 
kings used to lead their troops into battle, a custom still observed ‘apud Canibales’ (among 
the Cannibals).49 This last point exercised Besold on more than one occasion: should the king 
fight at the head of his troops? It was a well-known ‘indeterminate’ question, with arguments 
pro et contra. On this point, the German writer referred his reader to ‘Contre la faineantise’ 
where a post-1588 addition debates precisely this issue, maintaining that it is inconsistent 
with a prince’s office and standing to delegate the fighting to another (V 676-77).50 As in 
Montaigne himself, changing perspective – moving abroad, seeing things from elsewhere – 
allows Besold to comment in general terms on the practices of contemporary German society, 
although with a more limited degree of critique than is usual in his French model. 
 
This brief survey of Besold’s debt to Montaigne has necessarily omitted a number of 
spheres where the essayist’s influence can be distinctly traced; marriage, medicine, embassies 
and parleys are among them.  Taken all together, they indicate the German jurist’s absorption 
of the Essais at the levels of intellectual approach and of technique and composition.  The 
Montaigne who emerges from his work presents not so much an integrated portrait as a series 
of snapshots adjusted to the needs of any particular context.  The Essais are at once 
fragmented and dispersed among Besold’s large corpus and yet re-organised and 
systematised in order to feed a new set of ideas. Besold’s Montaigne is both prismatic and 
polymorphic; he is adapted to particular perspectives and angles of vision, but also sponsors a 
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large variety of uses and forms.  Some underlying connecting themes are nonetheless 
apparent, notably the Sceptical strain of thinking Besold adopts or highlights on particular 
occasions (but is nonetheless never a key to unlock all of his work). Yet more is at stake in 
Besold’s use of Montaigne than personal devotion to a favourite author. Ian Hunter provides 
the larger backcloth against which to view the German jurist’s activity here. He argues that, 
far from demonstrating the independence of early modern German philosophy from 
confessional or political identities, the competing programmes for philosophical training 
derived intrinsically from such identities.51 Philosophy was, he claims, a set of cognitive 
exercises aligned with ‘practices of the self whose outcome is the special and prestigious 
persona of the philosopher’.52 Besold’s incorporation of the Essais into his array of works 
can be viewed from the same standpoint. First and foremost, his emphasis on Montaigne as 
the embodiment of Socrates now takes on its full meaning: in the same way that Socrates 
offered Montaigne a philosophical persona, so now the French essayist performs the same 
function for Besold.  Equally, in the telling passage from the preface of Principium et finis, 
he articulates his own self-perception of his role and purpose in the light of Montaigne’s 
ideas, while quotations from the Essais among the philosophico-theological aphorisms of the 
Specimen or in the political doctrine of De Consilio politico or De Reipublicae ... 
comparatione are essential, not incidental, features in ‘the cultivation of an intellectual 
deportment required to accede to the truth’,53 of which De Verae Philosophiae fundamento, 
also informed by reading Montaigne, is one summative expression. Such a framework is a 
distinctive expression of Montaigne’s transit through German juridical thought and Besold 
was not alone in seeing the French essayist in this way. Later in the seventeenth century, 
Pufendorf made extensive reference to the Essais in his De Jure naturae et gentium of 1672; 
this has still to receive proper study, as indeed has the full story of the lawyers’ understanding 
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and use of Montaigne in early modern Europe.  Besold’s special contribution to this story 
nonetheless allows us to glimpse some of the avenues that await further investigation. 
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